Abstract: This article introduces a novel defensive framework that detects and obstructs the exploitation of malicious JavaScript (JS) injection by spotting the violation in the expected workflow of web applications deployed on the cloud data centres. The framework initially generates some categories of axioms by examining the strings of HTTP request and response. Likewise, it detects the deviation in the intended workflow of web application by examining the violation in such generated axioms. The prototype of our work was developed in Java development framework and installed on the virtual machines of cloud data centres located at the core of network. Susceptible web applications were utilised for evaluating the workflow violation detection capability in order to obstruct the execution of XSS worms on the cloud data centres. Evaluation result revealed that framework detects the injection of XSS worms with high precision rate and lesser rate of false positives and false negatives.
Introduction
Since, the blooming of internet and expansion of web applications with rich and advanced technologies, cloud computing paradigm has seen a tremendous change towards its adoption. Cloud computing abolishes the need of the IT sector to setup expensive IT infrastructure for performing computation to provide services to the different organisations. It is a computing model that entitles ubiquitous, easy on-request access to the shared pool of computational resources and data to the devices across the globe, connected via Internet. It provides numerous advantages such as low maintenance and hardware cost, easy accessibility, flexible and inevitable processes. It characterises by its more flexibility, high availability, high scalability, and multi-latency. Despite of its immense benefits, it provides many security and privacy concerns as data is stored in cloud, accessible to anyone, anywhere (Modi et al., 2013; Mather et al., 2009; Ponemon, 2011) . Figure 1 shows different types of cyber threats possible on the architecture of cloud computing.
Cloud computing is exponentially gaining popularity as it provides services to the user in every field including e-commerce, media, business, public sector, social networking and so on. Among all, OSN is the mostly accessible service on the cloud. It is the virtual place for information sharing and provides an easy way for interaction among people across the globe. This feature of OSNs attracts a number of cyber-attacks including malwares, XSS, SQL injection, DDOS, etc. Many web application vulnerabilities in traditional settings of Internet also occur in the infrastructures of cloud computing environment. JavaScript (JS) injection vulnerabilities are considered to be the topmost threat that have turned out to be a plague for the modern web applications like Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc. (Gupta et al., 2015; Gupta and Gupta, 2014, 2015a) . The injection of such vulnerability leads to an exploitation of XSS attack on the contemporary platforms of web applications. Such attacks steal the sensitive credentials of the active users by injecting the malicious JS code in the form of some posts on such web applications.
The statistics of Acunetix Web Application Vulnerability Report (2015) clearly reveals that nearly 38% of websites are vulnerable to XSS attacks and falls first in the list. In addition, the statistics of 2015 Website Security Statistics Report (2015) by White Hat undoubtedly discloses that XSS is a significant issue across all platforms of diverse languages utilised by modern web applications. Figure 2 illustrates the execution of JS injection vulnerability that leads to the exploitation of XSS attack on the cloud data centres. The main effects of XSS attack include disinformation, DDOS attack, phishing, account hijacking, information disclosure, drive-by-download attack, etc. It is a challenging task to spot XSS attack due to the relatively unchanged behaviour of the browser and JS malicious code is hard to distinguish from the normal web content markup. Almost every large online application system has been hit by the JS worm. Website such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Drupal, etc. has been severely infected by the XSS attack. XSS attack is more likely to initiate on the web application with community-driven characteristics like social networking, forums, blogs, web mails, chat rooms, etc. XSS worm has the more capability to proliferate than the traditional worms like Code Red I, slammer, etc. It can be initiated at any time by the attacker because XSS vulnerability exists in almost 80% of the web application. 
Background on XSS attacks
XSS was initially found in applications that performed data processing on the server side where a server receives the user input, and then sent it back as a web page to the user (Gupta and Gupta, 2016a , 2016d Gupta et al., 2017) . The need for an enhanced user experience led to the popularity of web applications that performed most of its functions on the client-side. In 1995, Netscape introduced JS and soon after, hackers determined that if someone browses their web application, some web application in a frame could be forcibly loaded, crossing the boundaries between two websites -hence, labelled 'cross site scripting'. Netscape presented this problem as hackers started evading the control. Microsoft along with CERT published an advisory and distributed it to the customers whereas attackers generate malicious JS attack vectors for session hijacking, stealing cookies, etc. Finally, XSS outburst in 2005 once the Samy XSS worm shut down the MySpace. After Samy Kamkar's attack on MySpace, number of XSS attacks skyrocketed and within five years, XSS has become the most dangerous security threat to web applications and the internet. Recently, in 2015, XSS attack vectors were found in NASA website. To counter XSS, Netscape introduced the same origin policy (SOP). As JS programs are considered as unreliable software programs, databases downloaded from wide variety of websites are protected from each other using a defensive method known as SOP. This simply permits a JS program to read or write access to the contents that have an identical origin as the script itself. The origin is identified by the URL address: Host Name, Port Number, and Protocol Version. However Port Number and Protocol version are static in nature. On the other hand, the SOP is also fragile enough to permit partial cross domain access as Java Script can manipulate the host name. This policy merely has two alternatives: Either 'no access at all' or else 'unrestricted access'.
Existing defensive methodologies
Recently, we proposed some of the XSS defensive solutions that detects and mitigates the propagation of XSS worms from different platforms of web applications. Initially, we designed PHP-Sensor (Gupta and Gupta, 2015b ) that detects the exploitation of XSS and workflow violation attack concurrently on the open source platform of PHP web applications. The same set of malicious script found in the HTTP request and HTTP response will simply indicate the exploitation of XSS attack. However, we did not apply any advanced sanitisation mechanisms on such suspicious JS code for alleviating the effect of JS injection vulnerabilities. In addition, we introduced another technique (Gupta and Gupta, 2016c ) that integrates the XSS defensive framework of PHP-Sensor on the virtual machines of cloud platforms.
In this work, we tested the XSS attack detection capability by integrating the existing infrastructure of web applications in the data centres of cloud platforms with slight modifications. However, yet again, we did not apply any robust sanitisation mechanism on the detected malicious script code for mitigating the effect of JS injection vulnerabilities. Later on, we proposed a JS worm defensive framework (Gupta and Gupta, 2016a ) that detects and alleviates the effect of such worms from the modern platforms of online social network (OSN). Here, we initially determine the context of malicious variables of JS code and accordingly inject the sanitisation primitive routines in them. Similar to this work, numerous JS defensive methodologies had also introduced by other researchers that utilises context-aware sanitisation of JS worms. Livshits and Chong (2013) proposed an automated technique of sanitiser placement by statically analysing the stream of infected data in the program. However, placement of sanitiser is static and sometimes changes to dynamic wherever required. The technique accurately sanitises the string values and shrinks the quantity of nodes that involves the need for instrumentation. This technique presumes every possible source, sinks and sanitisers to be identified in advance, and then tries to position them mutually successfully. Samuel et al. (2011) proposed a type-qualifier based method that can be utilised with present templating languages to attain context sensitive auto-sanitisation. The proposed system builds an automated scheme that offers a template and a collection of sanitisers, repeatedly sanitises every untrusted injected input via sanitiser that corresponds to the context in which it is delivered.
Existing research gaps
Normally, web application development frameworks have restricted expressiveness of contexts and thus existing solutions (Gupta and Gupta, 2016a; Livshits and Chong, 2013; Samuel et al., 2011) cannot offer correct and completely context-aware auto-sanitisation mechanisms. In addition, they are unable to determine the nested context of such malicious JS variables. The novel solution must offer a type scheme that can be utilised to statically find out the contexts of injection positions in web templates by means of type inference. This permits for nested context aware auto sanitisation at runtime with no performance expenditure of finding out the HTML context. The researchers must incorporated such defence mechanism into the template compiler for Google Closure Templates, and assess the accuracy and exposure of their type inference system by means of production templates for different web services of Google. However, this sort of sanitisation is no longer effective as it does not determine the nested context of such untrusted variables. Therefore, most of the inner/nested context of such variables is uncovered with the sanitisation routines that lead to the exploitation of XSS worms. The JS worm defensive technique must incorporate a mechanism of determining the nested context of such malicious variables and must perform the accurate placement of sanitisation routines in such contexts.
In addition, the XSS worm detection capability of frameworks of existing literature were usually tested and evaluated by referring the XSS attack vectors from single source repository [i.e., XSS cheat sheet (Rsnake, 2008) On the other hand, some of the recent frameworks demands major alterations in the existing infrastructure of web applications. Moreover, the setup of existing framework of XSS defensive solutions couldn't be easily integrated in the virtual machines of cloud platforms Instead of referring the out-dated Internet settings for constructing an expensive setup, numerous commercial IT organisations are accessing the services of OSN sites (such as Twitter, Facebook, Linkedin, etc.) on the cloud platforms. Hence, the infrastructure settings of framework solution must be capable enough to integrate in the settings of cloud environment and should evaluate the JS worm recognition capability on the web applications deployed at the cloud data centres.
Sanitisation of JS attack payloads was considered to be the most effective mechanism for obstructing the exploitation of XSS worms on diverse platforms of web applications. However, our recent work (Gupta and Gupta, 2016a) sanitises such malicious payloads by determining their single level of context. They do not determine the nested context of JS variables. Sanitising the malicious tags/attributes of JS without determining their different nested context is considered to be ineffective as such attributes execute differently in different nested contexts. Nested context-aware sanitisation is deliberated as the utmost effective methodology for determining the diverse context of malicious attributes of HTML/JS and accordingly injects the sanitisation primitive routines on them.
Our key contributions
Based on such severe performance issues, this article makes the following contributions:
Workflow violation detection:
We generated some set of axioms corresponding to each extracted HTTP request (HREQ), HTTP response (HRES) and associated session state information. Such axioms will be utilised for detecting the violation in expected workflow of web applications. Such violation will simply indicate the injection of JS worms on the injection points of web applications.
Nested context-aware sanitisation:
The tainted flow of malicious variables was traced and determined their multiple nested contexts and subsequently executes the sanitisation on these diverse contexts of JS variables.
Experimental testing and evaluation: Vulnerable web applications (integrated on the cloud data centres) were utilised to test the JS worm detection capability of our work. Numerous categories of XSS attack vectors were injected on the injection points of such web applications for evaluating the robustness of our work.
Performance assessment: Two statistical methods (i.e., F-test and F-measure) are used to assess the performance of our work. In addition, a comparison-based analysis was also done with the existing related techniques in order to validate the performance of our technique.
So, overall, this article proposed a cloud-based defensive framework that detects the JS code injection vulnerabilities by sensing the violation in the expected workflow of real world web applications. The identification of suspicious variables will be performed and accordingly executes the nested context-aware sanitisation on them. Finally, the experimental evaluation and testing of our cloud-based framework was done on the tested platforms of real world web applications.
Outline
This paper is structured as follows: The overall design of our proposed framework is illustrated in Section 2. Section 3 explains the implementation platform and experimental evaluation of our framework. In addition, this section also focuses on performance analysis of observed results of our framework. A brief literature review is presented in Section 4 along with the comparison of these related techniques with our work. Finally, Section 5 concludes our work and discusses further possible efforts.
Proposed design
The proposed framework senses the violation in the normal workflow of web applications for detecting the JS injection vulnerabilities on the cloud data centres located at the core of the network. In addition, for alleviating the effect of such vulnerabilities, we enhanced the existing conventional sanitisation method (i.e., context-sensitive sanitisation) and introduced a novel nested context-aware sanitisation. Instead of determining only the visible outer context of malicious variables of JS, this novel sanitisation method determines the hidden encapsulated contexts of attributes of HTML/JS code. The novelty of our work lies in the fact that it determines the suspicious variables of JS code by examining the violation in some generated axioms that clearly violates the usual intended workflow of web applications. The outer context (and possibly nested context) of illicit variables of JS code will be determined and accordingly inject the sanitisation routine functions in them. Since, tags/attributes of JS execute differently in diverse contexts, therefore, it is a high time to utilise the capabilities of nested context-aware sanitisation for determining the hidden context of suspicious variables of JS code. Existing solutions (Gupta and Gupta, 2016a; Livshits and Chong, 2013; Samuel et al., 2011) determine only the outer/visible context of such malicious code and accordingly inject the sanitisation templates on them. This conventional one layer of context-sensitive sanitisation does not determine the hidden context that is encapsulated inside the outer context and therefore, such uncovered context does not undergo any process of sanitisation. Keeping in this view, our work finds out diverse category of context encapsulated in the tags of JS code and subsequently injects the sanitisation routine functions in them. The following subsection illustrates the overview of our proposed design.
Design overview
This subsection discusses the outline of our framework, which obstructs the exploitation of XSS attack on the web applications deployed in the cloud data centres located at the core of the network. The proposed framework requires few slightly modifications in the infrastructure of such data centres and does not demand alterations in the existing source code of web applications. Figure 3 highlights the abstract view of our proposed design integrated in the existing platforms of cloud. The proposed framework has two main modules: virtual cloud workflow violation detection server (VCWVDS) and virtual cloud XSS attack detection server (VCXDS). Our technique operates in two modes: training and online.
In training mode, VCWVDS generates some sort of axioms by retrieving the consecutive strings of HREQ form the cloud user and HRES from the web application server (WAS) of PHP web application. On the other hand, in online mode, VCWVDS detects the deviation in the intended workflow of PHP web application by referring the set of generated axioms produced in the training mode. In addition to this, VCXDS extracts the HRES in an online mode and performs the parsing on the embedded HTML and JS document in HRES. It then generates the document object model (DOM) tree and extracts the script nodes for performing the nested context-aware sanitisation in the malicious script code in an automated manner. In this manner, VCXDS component alleviates the effect of malicious JS injection from contemporary platforms of web applications installed in the virtual machines of cloud platforms. 
Detailed illustration
The proposed framework operates in two modes: training and online mode. For recognition of workflow violation, our work executes in training mode. Alternatively, for the detection of malicious JS injection in HRES message and injection of nested context-sensitive sanitisers in the code of web applications, our model operates in online mode. The detailed illustration of both these modes is explained in the following subsections.
Training mode
The key modules of VCWVDS in this mode are highlighted in Figure 4 . The HREQ message view composer generates category of session states on reception of each HREQ message for the cloud user. The generated session states are transmitted to the attribute accumulator. As soon as, appropriate quantity of traces gets retrieved, the training mode will get initiated. All the extracted templates of web pages will be retrieved by the pattern extorter component.
The extracted HREQ and HRES messages will get break down into key values corresponding to the category of session variables. Finally, these values will be supplied to the axiom generator component for generating all three classes of axioms. The detailed algorithm of extraction of axioms for the VCWVDS in the training mode is illustrated in Figure 5 . The extracted set of web page patterns and axioms will be stored in the pattern repository and axioms repository. We have utilised the capabilities of Daikon engine for transforming the extracted set of attributes into a perceptible layout. The generated axioms will cover the expected functionality of web applications.
Online mode
After the successful generation of axioms at the training mode, the proposed technique is ready to execute in the cloud data centres in online mode for detection of workflow violation as well as JS worms in PHP web applications. Figure 6 highlights the key modules employed in the VCWVDS for the detection of workflow violation at online mode. Initially, the parsing will be performed on the extracted axioms by the axiom analyst module employed in the VCWVDS. In online mode, the extracted HREQs will be combined with the session related variables by the HREQ message view composer and send this combined info towards variation sensor component for detecting any variation. If the HREQ message is validated successfully, then this message is registered successfully and transferred to the WAS. Otherwise, simply reject the corresponding HREQ message. On the other hand, if the HREQ was found to be a redirection message, at that time, such message will not be registered and get simply rejected. In addition to this, a unique key will be allocated to a web page corresponding to its template, if the HREQ constitutes a web page. Finally, based on this information, HRES message is generated at the WAS and transmitted to the variation sensor component deployed in the VCWVDS, where this message will be acknowledged. If the HRES message is validated successfully, unique assigned key would be registered successfully for the current session and finally, PHP web page will be transferred to the web browser of online user. Otherwise, simply reject the HRES message and the related session variables and registered keys. Figure 7 illustrates the detailed algorithm for the detection of workflow violation in VCWVDS in online mode.
Detailed description of workflow violation
Initially, the expected specifications of web applications are retrieved in training mode by extracting the values of variables related to that session and the strings of HREQ and HRESs. Secondly, in online mode, the inferred blueprint is utilised for examining the stored values of session variables as well as chain of HREQ and HRESs for detecting the deviations in the estimated flow of web application. Usually, values of session variables are inserted in cookies. Alternatively, such values are also maintained by the web server including their session ids.
Such session identifiers are utilised for identifying the corresponding session states in a unique manner. However, the values of session variables will be retrieved in online mode for all extracted HREQs irrespective of the web application utilised. In this article, we have developed an algorithm that generates the three set of axioms. Such axioms describe the intended actions of PHP web applications. The first category of axioms highlights the relationship between the session variables and the associated HREQ messages. The second category of axioms identifies the relationship between HREQ as well as the associated HRES including the required alterations in the session variables. The third category of axiom will be utilised if session variables are not well defined and this axiom strongly correlates the relationship between consecutive HREQs as well as HRESs. The next subsection illustrates the prototype structure of PHP web application. 
END if IF H RES is a HTML web page
Allocate the response key to the HTML web page Generate the output 'O' by referring the set of extracted templates (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , -----------T N ). Transmit the output 'O' to the variation detector component.
END if if O(1) // output is acknowledged
Register the key value pair for current session of user.
Transfer the generated web page to the browser.
Else
Obstruct the H RES message and cancel the present input. End the session of user and delete all the key value pairs. END
Prototype of web application
Generally, the prototype of web application is deliberated as a stateless structure (ST L ), which takes some input values (W I ) and generate some output (W O ).
ST W W W I consists of chain of HREQ messages and associated session variables. Usually, HREQ is divided into two main components: a key and a requested file. The key comprises of function of HREQ message. In the same way, HRES message consists of a web page ID and quantity of session variables. We have assigned a unique identifier to all the extracted templates of a web page, the web page associated with the HRES can be identified with key K (W O ). In the next subsection, we will explain the technique of representing a web page into a set of templates and associated output parameters.
Web page symbolisation
In order to generate a better representation of a web page, we have utilised the capabilities of crawler for extracting all possible patterns of web page. We have referred numerous methodologies mentioned in the recent state-of-art techniques (Kim and Shim, 2011; Reis et al., 2004) for extracting the patterns of web page. In addition to this, we have also generated the DOM tree of the extracted patterns of web page by referring the technique mentioned in Kim and Shim (2011) . Figure 8 describes an algorithm for performing the mining on all extracted web pages. The algorithm for performing the mining on the web page consists of conversion of extracted web pages into DOM tree for traversing all the possible paths. We focused on such paths of web page patterns that contribute towards the dynamic information. In order to perform the grouping on the two web pages, we have also calculated the similarity distance between any two extracted patterns of web pages.
Axiom extraction
Figure 10 describes the detailed algorithm for retrieving three categories of axioms corresponding to the extracted session variables and series of HREQ and HRES messages.
For recognition of workflow violation in the extracted HRES messages, the extracted keys of HRESs are linked by three extracted categories of axioms. All three categories of axioms will be transformed in the shape of an estimation function, which triggers on certain extracted category of HREQs. The estimation function holds true if set of certain HREQ follows an axiom, other this function returns false. Figure 11 highlights the detailed algorithm of workflow violation in the online phase.
Detailed description of XSS attack detection by VCXDS in online mode
After the successful execution of VCWVDS in online mode for detecting the violation in expected flow of website, the execution of VCXDS will get started. The detection of injection of malicious JS code that causes the exploitation of XSS attack will only execute in the online mode. Figure 9 highlights the proposed JS worm detection framework implemented in the VCXDS. Initially, parsing is performed on both the extracted HTML and JS documents. After the initial parsing of HTML document, the external location of files of JS is retrieved by transmitting the asynchronous JS XML HREQ (AJAX) to the external web server. Output: Extracted set of web page patterns (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , -----------P N ) Start Retrieve the web page W P from the web server. Generate the DOM representation of W P and transform this representation into set of possible retrieved paths (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , -------P N ) Set a minimum threshold value T H , that defines the quantity of paths implanted in the related web page. Retrieve the subset of paths 'p' (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , -------P N ), which simply points towards the text nodes and script nodes. Extract the set of possible web page patterns (W P1, W P2, W P3, --------W PN ) from the subset of path set 'p'. Denote the set of retrieved paths by crucial paths (CRUC P ) including support lesser than the value of T H . Perform the grouping on the pair of web pages only if they belong to similar category of CRUC P . Calculate the similarity distance S IM between the two grouped web pages by using the following formulae:
Where CCRCP (w i , w j ) is number of crucial pathways implanted in web pages w i and w j . Exclude all the paths that does not belong to the same category of CRUC P . Identify the value of parameters pointing towards text and script nodes. Extract the parameters injected in the web page as the class of o/p parameters of web page patterns (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , -----------P N ). Refer only the persistent list of input parameters P i (r) 3.
Values of S v (r) must always be retrieved by utilizing the enumeration set V (s, r).
4.
Values of P i (r) must always be retrieved by utilizing the enumeration set V (p, r). 5.
Related values of P i (r) must be similar to one of the associated values of S v (r). Axiom 2 1.
Values of session variable must be similar to the value of output constraints. 2.
Session states must not be affected. Axiom 3 1.
Retrieve key input/output pairs by referring all possible request keys 'r'. 2.
Maintain the H REQ key in all respective sessions. Extract the scripts by referring the script nodes of the DOM tree and call this set as 'B'. Transmit both the extracted set 'A' and set 'B' to the recursive decoding for performing the decoding on these two extracted sets of JavaScript files. Finally, transmit this set to the resemblance detector for detecting any similar JavaScript file in both these sets. The similar set of JavaScript files will indicate the presence of XSS worm. End
Figure 11 Algorithm for workflow violation detection
The extracted set of JS files will be denoted as set 'A'. In the similar way, after the execution of parsing of extracted JS document embedded in the HRES message, the next set of scripts will be extracted through DOM tree. Now, the set of scripts extracted here will be denoted as set 'B'. Now, both these sets 'A' and 'B' will be decoded in a recursive manner until all the scripts from both these set of scripts gets completely transformed in decoded form. After the successful recursive decoding procedure, both these decoded set of scripts will be explored by the resemblance detector component for the similar code. The presence of similar code in both such decoded sets 'A' and 'B' will point towards the possible JS worms. The different nested context of such malicious similar code will be identified and accordingly inject the sanitisation templates in them. This sort of sanitisation will sanitise the JS code in a nested context-aware manner and such process will guarantee the safe interpretation of scripts on the web browser of cloud user. Figure 12 illustrates the detailed algorithm of XSS detection framework integrated in the VCXDS. In addition to this, we have referred the list of taint sources and sinks for recognising the sources of untrusted data.
We have also explored for the critical sinks as well as equivalent exploits that may occur if data is utilised deprived of any sort of nested context-aware sanitisation. Table 1 highlights the sources of untrusted data, possible dangerous flow sinks and their resultant attack exploitation.
While extracting the set of scripts from the DOM tree for the set 'B', we have carefully access the DOM properties of the JS document. The objects retrieved by the DOM tree could be any attribute or keyword that can also result in stealing of cookie file and history related to that web page, that can be further useful for tracking the surfing behaviour of cloud user. In order to avoid this, we have maintained a blacklist of DOM properties that are used for the exploitation of XSS worms. Table 2 highlights the list of such DOM properties. On the other hand, while sending the AJAX request to the remote servers for the extraction of external JS files, VCXDS detects certain HTML attributes and tags that point towards the location of remote servers containing malicious script files. VCXDS simply blocks such attributes and tags and extracts the JS files from the remote location of these servers.
On the other hand, we have also maintained a white list of benign attributes and associated tags with their related permitted file categories. Table 3 highlights the details of whitelist of HTML attributes and tags with their allowable file types.
The script HTML element could encompass dangerous code as well as the link and object tags that could automatically copy and run dangerous code. HTML attributes like object, frameset, and body elements could include event handlers (EH) that again could run dangerous code in an automated manner. VCXDS has identified the list of these event attributes after the successful detection of XSS worms and finally sanitise them in a nested contextsensitive manner. Table 4 highlights the blacklist of malicious event attributes utilised for the exploitation of XSS worms. These can be utilised to run malicious script files. Our technique recognises such HTML attributes as well as elements as possibly malicious. After the successful detection of similar code in both the extracted sets 'A' and 'B' , the final step of VCXDS is to sanitise this similar code in a nested context-aware manner for its safe interpretation on the web browser of cloud user. In order to sanitise XSS attack vectors, web application initially requires confirming that every variable outputs associated with a web page are properly encoded/encrypted before being reverted towards the web browser. Thwarting XSS attack vectors implies to replace all possible exceptional characters utilised in the exploitation of such attacks. Our work detects malicious characters through utilising &# arrangement followed through its code of character. Table 5 highlights some of the list of encoding methods of HTML tags and attributes. Sanitisation is a process for substituting the untrusted user variable with the sanitised variable. Figure 13 illustrates the algorithm for sanitisation of untrusted JS code. Suspicious scripts are sanitised according to the nested context in which they are used in the HTML document. STC stores the list of the script templates and SAC is used to store sanitised JS strings. For every template ST I ST C , firstly, it removes placeholders. Then, it searches for the untrusted variable and stores it in the S V to determine the context (CTX) and then apply the sanitiser (SP) according to the context in which S V is used. Sanitised variable is stored in JSP and then it is appended to the SPR_log for more effective result. Finally, SPR_log is passed as a parameter to the apply_sanitization_routines () function that injects the sanitisation routine primitive units and return the sanitised HTTP response S HRES to the web browser of network of smart devices. 
Encoding methods Description
URI encoding "<" is also represented by "%3C"
Decimal HTML character encoding "<" is also represented by "&#60" or "&#0060;"
Hexadecimal HTML character encoding "<" is also represented by "&#x3c" or "&#X0003c;
Unicode encoding "<" is also represented by "\u003c" or \u003C"
Hex encoding "<" is also represented by "\x3c" or \x3C HTML entity encoding "<" is also represented by "&lt;"
Prior to sanitisation, the key specialty of our work is to determine the nested context of malicious variables of JS code and accordingly performs the sanitisation on them. Recent techniques (Gupta and Gupta, 2016a; Livshits and Chong, 2013; Samuel et al., 2011) find only the outer context of variables of JS code and subsequently inject the sanitisation primitive units on them. In addition, such techniques inject the redundant sanitisers in the source code of web applications that decreases the response time of the web servers. In our work, we determine the nested context of malicious variables of JS code and likewise, execute the injection of sanitisation primitive units in such nested contexts of script code. Table 6 ) in all the injected attributes/tags of malicious JS code and accordingly inject the sanitisation primitive routines in them. In order to obstruct the execution of such malicious JS variables, we determine the nested context of variables of JS code and accordingly perform the sanitisation on them. Table 6 highlights the list of different possible context of HTML code. HTML data can exist in four different contexts (PCDATA, RCDATA, Tag Name and ATTRIBNAME). Sometimes, such different contexts may be embedded inside other context. For, e.g., PCDATA can be embedded inside the RCDATA. The existing sanitisation-based XSS defensive solutions (Gupta and Gupta, 2016a; Livshits and Chong, 2013; Samuel et al., 2011) could not able to determine the nested context of JS variables, hence unable to execute the sanitisation on them. In our technique, as soon as, our work detects the variation in intended workflow of web application, it additionally identifies the tainted flow of suspicious variables. Such variables will undergo through the process of nested context-aware determination and subsequently injects the sanitisation primitive units in them. Injection of such units will alleviate the effect of JS injection vulnerabilities from the contemporary platforms of web applications.
Implementation and experimental evaluation
The prototype of our framework was developed in Java development framework and integrated its settings on the infrastructure of cloud data centres. The proposed design integrates two modules (i.e., VCWVDS and VCXDS) on the platforms of virtual Cloud server. VCWVDS generates the category of axioms in the training mode with respect to the extracted set of specifications of HREQ and HRES. These axioms will be referred in the online mode for discovering the violation in the expected specifications of web application. Any violation observed in these extracted class of axioms will be denoted as workflow violation in the expected workflow of web application. On the other hand, VCXDS extracts the HRES in the online mode for performing the nested context-sensitive sanitisation in the script code embedded in the nodes of DOM tree of HTML document. The execution of such category of sanitisation will guarantee the complete alleviation of JS worms from the HRES.
We have implemented the design of our proposed framework in two modes: training and online mode. The proposed virtual cloud WV detection server (VCWVDS) is implemented in Java and integrated its functionality as a virtual cloud server on the cloud environment. The capability of VCWVDS is utilised in both training and online modes. In addition to this, the proposed VCXDS is developed in Java platform and assembled its functionality on the virtual cloud server. The proficiency of VCXDS is only utilised in online mode. We have also utilised the VMware Workstation 7 for modifying two virtual desktop systems to act as a VCWVDS and VCXDS including one desktop system to be act as WAS.
The experiment background is simulated with the help of a normal desktop system, comprising 1.6 GHz AMD processor, 3 GB DDR RAM and Windows 10 operating system. The JS worm detection capability of our work was evaluated on a tested suite of five open source PHP websites deployed in virtual machines of cloud platforms. Table 7 highlights the detailed configuration of these web applications. We have utilised five open source platforms of web applications whose user injection points are vulnerable to suspicious JS strings. In order to exploit the vulnerabilities of XSS attack, it is not all necessary that an attacker has to inject the full vulnerable JS code; an attacker can also perform the partial suspicious script injection on such web applications. Such virtual platforms of web applications are vulnerable to such partial JS injection and therefore, this is one of the key reason to select these vulnerable platforms of web application, while evaluating the XSS attack detection capability of our framework. On the other hand, such infrastructures of web applications are not considered to be the benchmark for evaluating the XSS attack detection capability of any defensive framework. There are also other platforms (e.g., Humhub, Drupal, Wordpress, Joomla, etc.) on which one can access the performance of his/her XSS defensive framework. However, we select five platforms that are vulnerable in different context of exploitation of XSS attack and that surely covers in all these platforms.
Simplecms (Simplecms: Simple Content Management System, http://www.couchcms.com/) is exposed to the authentication bypass vulnerability. This application permits an attacker to adjust the value of request parameter (i.e., logged in =1), which in turn allows the access to sensitive functionality of the web application related to the administrative controls. In addition to this, it also permits the attacker to inject the vulnerable JS code in numerous injection points of this web application. OsCommerce Inc.
(http://www.oscommerce.com/) is a freely available e-commerce and online store-management web application. It could be utilised on numerous web servers like MYSQL, WAMP, etc. WebCalender (WebCalender 1.2, http://sourceforge.net/ projects/webcalendar/) is an event management application and does not allow an attacker to run any random code; however, it permits an intruder to alter value of numerous state variables to access illicit rights. PunBB (PunBB 1.4, http:punbb.informer.com) is a PHP web application in which system uses a user-supplied variable to incorporate the applicable language documents. Unluckily, the usersupplied value of variable is not validated properly, which in turn permits an attacker to alter this value for injecting the malicious code. BlogIt (PHP-blogit, http:sourceforge. net/projects/php-blogit/) is exposed to two types of attacks: authentication violation attack and file inclusion attack. The former vulnerability permits illegitimate users to gain access to sensitive administrative functionality. On the other hand, the later vulnerability allows an attacker to transfer the malicious data on server. However if uploaded documents uploads with a .php extension, then the web application infers document as PHP script, runs it plus therefore permits an attacker to run random malicious commands.
To obtain offline traces, user simulator is required to execute each web application, which imitates the communications between a web application and regular user. Initially, numerous atomic functions and roles of user are manually recognised for every web application. After this, using the capabilities of web driver of Selenium (SeleniumHQ: Web Application Testing System, http://seleniumhq.org/) development of simulator of cloud user is initiated. The cloud user simulator utilises an archive of data of several students of specific domain related to cyber security and is capable enough to run the web application, such as filling the information, submitting data, etc. The simulator of cloud user is deployed at a 1.63 GHz Dual Core Processor with 6GB RAM running Win XP and Google Chrome. The user interface of the client is linked to the server via a cable of Ethernet.
Workflow violation analysis on VCWVDS
Initially, we obtained the execution-related traces by conducting the training mode in the cloud computing environment. These traces include quantity of HREQ retrieved, amount of PHP pages, HREQ keys, quantity of pattern of PHP pages as well as quantity of three axioms generated in the VCWVDS. Table 8 shows the figures of execution-related traces at training mode of VCWVDS. In order to notice the effect of quantity of training set in the training mode on the number of retrieved axioms, we alter the magnitude of training set and calculate the consequent axioms. Figure 14 shows the results that are perceived for OsCommerce website. It is obviously reflected from Figure 14 that initially, number of axiom I and axiom III degrade. On the other hand, number of axiom II primarily escalates plus then equally slowly unites. Now for the detection in violation of intended workflow of web application, our technique will transit to the online mode. Numerous web pages obtained from the extracted HREQs are generated by the simulator. We exploit the fourteen attack examples in diverse settings of environment on all five web applications deployed in the virtual machines of cloud data centres. Table 9 shows the summary of the results of workflow violation in VCWVDS at online mode. Each exploited attack is detected by the proposed framework in the virtual machines of cloud platform with acceptable false positive rate and less runtime overhead.
False positive rate assessment
We have also noticed certain false positives and find out two root issues in observing such false positives. The first reason of observing false positive is due to the limited assessment of overall web applications deployed in the settings of cloud platform. In our work, error web pages are not surveyed by our simulator, and such web pages have become the reason for false positive rate. The second reason of observing the false positive rate is due to the inaccurate symbolisation process of PHP web pages in the training phase of VCWVDS. This process has also disturbed the training and online phase of our work. In training phase, the quantity of axiom II category is rigorously connected to the amount extracted patterns of web pages. It is also noticed that the amount of axiom I and axiom III merges very wildly, and hence degrade the rate of false positive for HREQ. However, axiom II category produces extra false positive rate for HRESs. In the online mode, it was quite often observed that a web page is wrongly categorised in the shape of a template that probably can obtain wrong input/output pairs and hence generates a false positive. Although, generating the templates of PHP web applications manually is not concern in our work. Instead, we use some of the methods for TEXT (Kim and Shim, 2011 ) that runs well with the five utilised web applications.
In the online mode of VCWVDS, we observed that some of the generated axioms are violated by certain attacks. Axiom I category was violated due to insufficient investigation of session variables associated to the HREQ. In some cases, type II axioms are also violated due to the omitted phase of authentication. Moreover, JS worms can also be detected via axiom I category if parameters are connected to associated session variables. XSS worms can too be recognised by axiom II category, if subsequent PHP web page consists of those values of parameter that are associated to a particular state of a session.
JS worm detection analysis on VCXDS
For the XSS worm detection in the five tested suite of vulnerable web applications deployed in the virtual machines of cloud computing, we injected the XSS attack vectors in the injection points of these web application. This has been done for evaluating the XSS attack detection capability on such platforms of web applications. In terms of accuracy, we estimate what percent of 'unsurprisingly arising' XSS attack vectors are alleviated by VCXDS. In terms of performance, we evaluate the performance-related issues of executing the VCXDS on a variety of web page-loading and JS standards.
Table 10
Categories of XSS worms with their pattern examples
XSS worm category Explanation Script example

CES
The techniques of character encoding are utilised for exemplifying a database of typescripts through certain encoding system. Such techniques are utilised for calculation, data storing, and broadcast of documented info and could be utilised for exploiting numerous attacks.
%253cscript%253ealert(document.cookie)%253c/script%253e ECT This category of attack is generally embedded inside the normal syntax of JavaScript code.
<IMG SRC="jav&#x09;ascript:alert('XSS');"> EH These are non-compulsory system commands in the form of scripts, which only execute when an alteration is observed in the service state.
<input onBlur ="alert('xss')" type="text" > HQE This category is generally used for exploiting the XSS attack on web applications that permit "<script>" tag but not "<SCRIPT SRC…"
<script src="data:text/javascript,alert(1)"></script> Figure 15 Observed results of our technique on all platforms of web applications (see online version for colours)
The XSS attack vectors are referred from the five publically freely available XSS attack repositories (Rsnake, 2008 ; HTML5, http://html5sec.org/; 523 XSS Vectors Available, http://xss2.technomancie.net/vectors/; Technical Attack Sheet for Cross Site Penetration Tests, http://www. vulnerability-lab.com/resources/documents/531.txt; @XSS Vector Twitter Account, https://twitter.com/XSSVector). We have categorised the JS attack vectors into four main categories, i.e., character encoding scripts (CES), embedded character tags (ECT), EH and HTML quote encapsulation (HQE). Table 10 illustrates the attack patterns of these categories of XSS attack vectors. Figure 15 highlights the observed results of VCXDS on five real world web applications corresponding to chosen categories of JS worms. 
Performance assessment
We have also calculated the XSS detection rate of VCXDS by dividing the number of attacks detected (i.e., # of true positives) to the number of XSS attack vectors injected on each individual PHP web application. Table 11 highlights the detection rate of all five web applications w.r.t. individual category of XSS worms. It is clearly reflected from Table 11 that OsCommerce and BlogIt observed overall higher percentage detection rate in all the four categories of XSS worms. In the next two subsections, we have evaluated the performance analysis of VCXDS by applying two statistical analysis methods: F-measure and F-test.
Performance analysis using F-measure
In this section, we discuss the performance evaluation of VCXDS during XSS worm detection testing on open source websites. We have presented detailed performance analysis of VCXDS by conducting a statistical analysis method (i.e., F-measure). F-measure generally analyses the performance of system by calculating the harmonic mean of precision and recall. The analysis conducted reveals that VCXDS exhibits high performance as the observed value of F-measures in all the platforms of web applications is 0.9. Therefore, VCXDS exhibits 90% success rate in all the five web applications. It is clearly reflected from table that the highest performance of VCXDS (i.e., 96.2%) is observed in the Web Calender. In addition to this, VCXDS exhibits performance rate of minimum 90% in the remaining four web applications.
Performance analysis using F-test hypothesis
In order to prove that the number of JS worms detected is less than to the number of XSS attack vectors injected, we use the F-test hypothesis, which is defined as:
Null hypothesis: H0 = Number of JS worms detected is same than the number of JS worms injected. (S12 = S22)
Alternate hypothesis: H1 = Number of JS worms injected is greater than number of JS worms detected (S12< S22) The level of Significance is ( = 0.05). The detailed analyses of statistics of JS worms applied and detected are illustrated in Tables 13 and 14 . In this paper, we utilised and injected total of 160 JS worms from the freely available XSS attack repositories (Rsnake, 2008; HTML5, http 
Performance analysis using response time calculation
For better analysis of performance analysis, we have also calculated the response time of VCWVDS and VCXDS in online mode for the detection of workflow violation as well as JS worms in different frameworks and cloud platforms. Nowadays, several IT organisations install the setup of their web applications in the infrastructures of cloud for better response time efficiency. The same optimised response time was observed in both the modules (i.e., VCWDS and VCXDS) of our framework deployed in the virtual machines of cloud environment. Table 15 highlights the response time of both these proposed modules of our technique in different environment (without cloud infrastructure) and cloud platform. It is clearly reflected from Table 15 that the highest response time of our work is observed on the virtual machines of cloud data centres. On the other hand, we have also compared the performance analysis of existing client-side XSS filter [i.e., IE8 (Ross, 2008) , NoScript (Maone, 2012) and XSSAuditor (Bates et al., 2010) ] with our work. Such filters are installed as an extension on the existing infrastructure of web applications. Here also, we have verified the malicious script detection capability of such filters by injecting 127 XSS worms on our five different web applications. Figure 11 highlights the statistics of performance comparison of our framework with existing client-side XSS filters. It can be clearly observed from Figure 16 that the value of F-measure is decreasing in all the platforms of web applications for such filters in comparison to our work.
Although, client-side XSS filters performs the sanitisation on the untrusted variables of JS attack payloads in a context-aware manner, yet this filter is not capable enough to determine all possible contexts of such untrusted variables. Therefore, the sanitisation of such variables in such malicious context becomes ineffective for such existing XSS filters. However, our work is capable enough to determine the probable different context of malicious variables of JS prior to the execution of nested context-sensitive sanitisation procedure. In addition, we tested the response time of JS worm detection capability on the cloud data centres as well as in other environment (i.e., without cloud infrastructure. The response time observed was high for all the five platforms of web applications deployed on the cloud data centres in comparison to other settings of infrastructure.
Related work
This section discusses some of the existing state-of-art techniques related to our work. We have identified main contributions and current performance issues in the recent protective techniques of XSS worms as well as Workflow violation attacks. Table 16 illustrates the methodology strengths and existing performance issues in the recent existing state-of-art techniques related to our work. (Li and Xue, 2013) It generates the finite state machine (FSM) and the behaviour of web application is observed over some unexpected user inputs to discover the logic vulnerabilities in web applications.
It does not require the code of websites for generating the web application specifications.
LogicScope is somehow not familiar with the logic vulnerabilities that alter the integrity of database, since the effects of malicious user inputs cannot be revealed through HTTP web responses.
Enemy of the state (Doupe et al., 2012) It creates a black-box prototype of internal state machine of websites via transmitting HREQ frequently as well as observing the discrepancy in HRESs.
Detects the change in the state of the web application, determining the state-changing HREQs and thus capable enough to discover security flaws that are concealed behind the states of web application.
However this technique needs the implementation of infrastructure of web application and therefore brings the runtime performance overhead.
RoleCast (Son et al., 2011) It discovers the missing authentication checks in code of websites corresponding to each pattern in the web applications that identifies distinctive functionality of role of different types of users.
It generally discovers omitted security checks at a better granularity level by utilising the software engineering practices in PHP web applications Deduce the authorisation logic of web application under the supposition that most of the web application follow same code design patterns; it may go through from various false positives and false negatives.
Waler (Felmetsger et al., 2010) The methodology is based on the combination of dynamic analysis and symbolic model checking to discover the invariants from dynamic programming execution and then report the violations of invariants as logic vulnerabilities.
The authors have also successfully filtered the unauthentic invariants by examining the program control paths and identifying the association between session variables and database objects.
The types of vulnerabilities that can be recognised by Waler are restricted by the set of currently-implemented heuristics.
Content security policy (Stamm et al., 2010) It provides a method which permits the developers of web application to indicate from which sensitive locations their website is permitted to load supplementary resources.
It tries to diminish the web-based injection attacks by permitting the web applications to just execute external scripts from white-listed external JavaScript files.
Technique has been failed in those cases where a JavaScript-enabled web application has been compromised and is providing malicious JavaScript. CSP does not presently offer any security against cross-origin CSS import vulnerabilities. (Doupe et al., 2013) It redirects the inline JavaScript code to the external files of JavaScript where this code will be executed by referring the content security policies.
It secures the legacy web applications by automatically and statically rewriting an application so that the code and data are clearly separated in its web pages.
Technique could not able to handle JavaScript code in HTML attributes.
Path cutter (Cao et al., 2012) Path cutter initially separates different web pages from the web server at the web browser, and then validates the communication between several web pages at the web server side.
Path cutter generally jams the transmission path of XSS worms by restricting the DOM access to several different views at the web browser and hampers the illicit HTTP web requests to the web server.
The main drawback of the path cutter solution is the rendering latency observed by path-cutter at the web browser.
BIXSAN (Chandra and Selvakumar, 2011) Transfer the HTML code to XSS sanitiser, which parses the document for the detection of static tags. Finally, it transforms the HTML document into document object model (DOM).
It detects the malicious JavaScript code with very low rate of false negatives and false positives.
Since the BIXSAN was evaluated by referring the parsing quirks in the XSS cheat sheet (Rsnake, 2008) . But with the advancement in the technology of java script tags, this cheat sheet is dynamically growing day by day and BIXSAN is unable to detect the XSS attacks on them.
XSSAuditor (Bates et al., 2010) The filter can simply spot the components of the response which are considered as a script. It also scans the DOM tree generated by the HTML parser for the clear interpretation of the semantics of the bytes.
Realises equally extraordinary performance as well as high accuracy via jamming scripts following the HTML parsing and prior to execution.
The main issue with XSS Auditor is that it cannot solve the problem of isolating untrusted data from trusted data.
Flax (Saxena et al., 2010) It is a hybrid and dynamic analysis methodology, which examine the Java script-based web applications for the discovery of input validation vulnerabilities.
FLAX is a taint enriched black-box fuzzer, which is capable of finding the client side validation bugs in Java script programs with very high rate of true positives and low runtime overhead.
However, the testing of FLAX has not focused on the complexity of sanitisation errors, which still remain in the client-side Java script code.
Comparison
This section illustrates the comparison of our technique with the existing defensive methodologies of WV attacks as well as XSS attacks based on useful parameters. It is clearly reflected from Table 18 that all the recent defensive methodologies of XSS worms are not able to provide defense against DOM-based XSS worms that simply alters the DOM tree of client-side web page. In addition to this, rather than utilising the capabilities of context-sensitive sanitisation, most of these defensive solutions sanitise the malicious JS code in context-insensitive manner. Our work is able to inject the sanitisers in the source code of PHP-based web application in a nested context-sensitive manner. Moreover, our technique is able to detect the presence of XSS worms in the HRES message with acceptable false negative and false positive rate. Also, the proposed framework can be easily integrated in the virtual machines of cloud servers without requiring any modifications in the source code of PHP-based web applications. 
Novelty contributions
The key novelty of work lies in the fact that we transformed the conventional context-aware sanitisation method into nested context-aware sanitisation methodology. This novel sanitisation facilitates the web developers to determine the hidden and encapsulated context malicious variables of JS strings and subsequently executes the sanitisation on them. The sanitisation of different variables of different context requires different sanitisation primitive routine functions. Hence, the conventional sanitisation method adopted by recent methods (Gupta and Gupta, 2016a; Livshits and Chong, 2013; Samuel et al., 2011) injected the same sanitisation templates on variables, if they able to determine diverse context of JS variables. However, nested context-aware sanitisation injects different sanitisation primitive units on the suspicious variables of JS code corresponding to their different contexts. Our existing work (Gupta and Gupta, 2016a) fails to determine the hidden and nested context of malicious variables of JS code and if they do, they utilise the same sanitisation routine functions on all different contexts of script code. We have utilised the capabilities of our existing methodology [i.e., PHP-Sensor (Gupta and Gupta, 2015b) ] that detects the workflow violation and XSS attacks concurrently on the PHP web applications. However, during the performance assessment of this existing work, we encounter unwanted rate of false negatives and false positives. This is due to the fact that we handled both these attacks simultaneously that becomes a bottleneck for our prototype. Therefore, in our proposed work, we utilised the workflow violation detection capability of PHP-Sensor for the injection of JS worms in the injection points of web applications. The same set of axioms generated corresponding to extracted HREQ, HRES and session state information are utilised for detecting the violation in intended workflow violation of web applications. Any violation will simply provide the information regarding the injection of suspicious variables of JS code. In addition, our recent existing work (Gupta and Gupta, 2016a) assesses the JS worm detection of framework by utilising the JS attack vectors from the XSS cheat sheet. Such techniques did not refer the attack vectors from the other contemporary repositories of XSS attack vectors (HTML5, http://html5sec.org/; 523 XSS Vectors Available, http://xss2.technomancie.net/vectors/; Technical Attack Sheet for Cross Site Penetration Tests, http://www. vulnerability-lab.com/resources/documents/531.txt; @XSS Vector Twitter Account, https://twitter.com/XSSVector). However, we quantify the JS worm detection capability of our framework by injecting the malicious code vectors from all these repositories. Very few and acceptable rate of false positives and false negatives was observed and this validates the robustness of our work in comparison to our existing work.
Conclusions and future work
In this article, we proposed a novel framework that is integrated on the cloud data centres and obstructs the exploitation of suspicious JS worms by sensing the violation in the expected workflow of web application. We generated certain set of axioms corresponding to each extracted HTTP request, HTTP response and the associated session state information. The violation in the intended workflow of web applications is noticed by observing the discrepancy perceived in the generated axioms. Any such variation observed will simply indicate the injection of JS worms on the web applications accessed through the cloud data centres. In addition, we enhanced the conventional context-sensitive sanitisation procedure of JS worms and transform this procedure into nested context-aware sanitisation method. The method not only determines the outer context of malicious variables of JS code but also determines the hidden and nested context of such suspicious variables. The introduction of this novel method guarantees the complete alleviation of JS injection vulnerabilities from the injection points of web applications deployed on the core network of cloud data centres. Evaluation outcomes revealed that the workflow violation detection of web applications was proved to be very effective in escalating the malicious JS detection rate on different platforms of web applications with acceptable rate of false positives and false negatives. High precision rate and less performance overhead were observed during the rigorous process of injection of sanitisation routines in malicious JS code. We will try to completely integrate our defensive framework on the virtualised nodes of fog computing devices deployed on an edge of the network as a part of further work.
